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IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GENESIS GLOBAL HOLDCO, LLC,
GENESIS GLOBAL CAPITAL, LLC,
and GENESIS ASIA PACIFIC PTE.
LTD.,
Plaintiffs,
V.
DIGITAL CURRENCY GROUP, INC.,
BARRY SILBERT, MICHAEL
KRAINES, MARK MURPHY,
SOICHIRO "MICHAEL" MORO,
DUCERA PARTNERS, LLC, and
MICHAEL KRAMER,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 2025-0532 -KSJM
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) REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION
) Filed: May 19, 2025
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VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Genesis Global Holdco, LLC ("GGH"
)
, Genesis Global
Capital, LLC ("GGC"
)
, and Genesis Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. ("GAP," together with
GGH and GGC, the "Genesis Debtors" or "Plaintiffs," and together with their
wholly-owned subsidiaries and affiliates, "Genesis"
)
, in their individual capacities
and GGC in its capacity as assignee of claims assigned by Gemini Trust
Company, LLC ("Gemini"
)
, for their Verified Complaint against Genesis's parent
company, Digital Currency Group, Inc. ("DCG"
)
; DCG's founder, Chief Executive
Officer, and controlling stockholder, Barry Silbert; DCG's President and Chief
EFiled: May 19 2025 02:00PM EDT
Transaction ID 76293685
Case No. 2025-0532-KSJM
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Operating Officer, Mark Murphy; DCG’s former Chief Financial Officer, Michael
Kraines; GGC’s former Chief Executive Officer, Soichiro “Michael” Moro; DCG’s
investment banker, Ducera Partners, LLC (“Ducera”); and Ducera’s co-founder and
Chief Executive Officer, Michael Kramer (together, “Defendants”), allege upon
actual knowledge and information and belief as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. Genesis was the cryptocurrency lending firm founded by Barry Silbert
in 2015 and wholly owned by DCG, Silbert’s venture capital holding company.
Silbert and his cronies recklessly operated, exploited, and then bankrupted Genesis
following a spectacular campaign of fraud and self-dealing. Silbert used Genesis to
enrich himself and finance his broader cryptocurrency empire on off-market, unfair
terms before overseeing its demise. Under Silbert’s control, Genesis held itself out
primarily as a crypto lending platform that would accept creditor deposits of
cryptocurrencies (such as bitcoin
1
and ether
2
), promising to pay a fixed rate of interest
in kind on such deposits, while then lending cryptocurrencies to borrowers,
purportedly in accordance with conservative underwriting and collateralization
standards. In reality, Genesis was a pool of “other people’s money” that Silbert
1
“Bitcoin” with a capital “B” refers to the Bitcoin network and its protocol, whereas
“bitcoin” with a lowercase “b” or “BTC” refers to the digital asset of the Bitcoin network.
2
Ether or “ETH” is the digital asset of the Ethereum network.
3
deployed at will to generate profits for his other businesses and ultimately for himself.
But Genesis was severely undercapitalized, lacked reasonable risk management, and
had no board of directors or independent management of its own. Silbert, Murphy,
and Kraines called the shots for Genesis’s lending business and operated as de facto
managers for Genesis (each a “De Facto Manager” and together the “De Facto
Managers”) while Genesis was nominally led by Defendant Moro. At all relevant
times, Silbert and DCG dominated and controlled Genesis for their own benefit. As
a direct result of Defendants’ wrongdoing, as detailed herein, Genesis was insolvent
no later than December 31, 2021, and ultimately filed for bankruptcy on
January 19, 2023.
2. With DCG at the helm, there were few (if any) loan underwriting
controls at Genesis, together with inadequate collateralization standards and grossly
inadequate loan loss reserves. The failure to develop reasonable risk functions at the
company led Genesis to lend billions in unsecured or undersecured crypto and fiat
currency to an undiversified handful of counterparties that did not meet basic
standards of creditworthiness. As DCG itself admitted internally, Defendants
adopted a lending program at Genesis that was “flying blind” in terms of risk
management.
3. For example, Genesis’s loans were highly concentrated with just two
counterparties: the now-defunct cryptocurrency hedge fund Three Arrows Capital
4
Pte. Ltd. (“3AC”)
3
and the now-bankrupt cryptocurrency trading firm Alameda
Research LLC (“Alameda”), a sister company of FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), co-
founded by Sam Bankman-Fried.
4
3AC and Alameda were never creditworthy
counterparties by any measure. But Genesis’s reckless lending activities served
DCG’s broader goals: 3AC and Alameda, among others, purchased and posted DCG-
affiliated investment products as collateral for their loans, and used the Genesis funds
they borrowed to engage in risky trades that benefited Silbert’s crown jewel
cryptocurrency asset management company, Grayscale Investments, LLC
(“Grayscale”) and its flagship product, GBTC. These Grayscale trades allowed
borrowers to use loans from Genesis to purchase and later sell GBTC in exchange for
transferring BTC permanently to Grayscale. Grayscale minted money for Silbert,
charging a perpetual 2% in fees annually on the BTC transferred to Grayscale.
4. DCG also caused Genesis to issue hundreds of millions in
uncollateralized or undercollateralized loans to DCG and related entities—making
3
The founders of 3AC, Su Zhu and Kyle Davies, were imprisoned or went into hiding in
connection with the collapse of their Singaporean hedge fund. In September 2023, the
Monetary Authority of Singapore barred Davies and Zhu for nine years from participating
in regulated financial activities in Singapore due to 3AC’s risk management failures and
misrepresentations.
4
Alameda’s co-founder, Sam Bankman-Fried, and senior executives including its former
CEO Caroline Ellison and other FTX co-founder Gary Wang, were convicted of or pleaded
guilty to crimes arising from the fraudulent use of funds, lack of internal controls,
and deceptive practices.
5
the DCG group itself the third-largest counterparty of Genesis—on preferential off-
market terms and without arm’s-length negotiations. Indeed, DCG oversaw a wholly
fabricated internal credit rating system for borrowers at Genesis and then arbitrarily
assigned itself the highest “A” rating without anyone at Genesis performing due
diligence on DCG or its borrower affiliates.
5. In 2021, at DCG’s direction, Genesis’s lending activities grew
dramatically. It originated over $130 billion in loans that year, marking 587% growth
over the prior year, as a low-interest lending environment drove more traditional
lenders and borrowers into the cryptocurrency space. But when the crypto market
began to falter in early 2022, Silbert and the other Defendants made no attempts to
reverse course and address risks they had embedded in Genesis’s heavily
concentrated, highly correlated, woefully undercollateralized, and overvalued loan
book. Instead, Defendants acted to conceal Genesis’s insolvency while Silbert rushed
to insulate himself, his friends, and DCG from the inevitable fallout, in disregard of
the fiduciary duties they owed to Genesis
for the benefit of Genesis’s residual
claimants, including individual and institutional creditors. DCG was not interested
in prudent lending at Genesis for two simple reasons: first, Genesis’s lending
business fueled profits at Grayscale by increasing GBTC trading, and second, the
Genesis “bank” provided valuable liquidity on below-market terms to DCG and its
affiliates, which DCG unilaterally changed at will-even when Genesis was
insolvent.
6.
I
Despite this prophetic self-awareness, DCG took no steps to ensure that Genesis had
competent or independent management that would act in the best interest of Genesis
and its residual claimants, including creditors.
6
7
7. As early as 2021, reputable third-party consultants
8. Yet as the Genesis loan book grew from approximately $4 billion to
approximately $12 billion in outstanding loans from the end of 2020 to the end of
2021,
5
. While such
measures would have helped protect Genesis from catastrophic loss, they were
unappealing to Silbert because they would also have slowed the flow of capital to
Grayscale’s GBTC fund, which fueled profits for Grayscale and DCG. Accordingly,
despite Genesis’s insolvency, Silbert and his cronies at DCG, including Murphy and
Kraines, continued to operate and dominate Genesis to funnel profits to Silbert’s
larger empire at the expense of the hundreds of thousands of customers whose
deposits and life savings they put at risk. DCG’s compliant pawn, Genesis’s former
“CEO” Moro, unsurprisingly stood by and allowed DCG to pilfer Genesis; the
5
Genesis had very high turnover in its loan book, with its $130 billion in loan origination
throughout 2021 resulting in $12 billion of loans outstanding at the end of the year.
-■--
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Genesis employees who disagreed with Silbert or refused to do DCG’s bidding were
terminated and faced Silbert’s influential wrath in the industry.
9. As Defendants knew, but concealed from Genesis’s creditors, Genesis
was insolvent no later than December 31, 2021, as confirmed by each of the three
primary measures for assessing the solvency of lending institutions. Yet DCG,
Silbert, Murphy, Kraines, and Moro continued to loot Genesis for themselves despite
their fiduciary duties to Genesis and its creditors as residual claimants.
10. Once the cryptocurrency market spiraled downward during the spring
of 2022, Genesis could no longer survive DCG’s ongoing misuse of the Genesis
assets and lending platform. In May 2022, two popular cryptocurrencies, TerraUSD
and LUNA, collapsed. The next month, in June 2022, 3AC imploded. Genesis was
left with a $1.1 billion hole on its balance sheet due to its lack of proper risk
infrastructure. Shortly thereafter, Genesis’s largest customers Gemini and Bitvavo
Custody B.V. (“Bitvavo”) both threatened to pull significant assets: approximately
$3 billion in crypto and fiat currency that Gemini had arranged to be lent to Genesis,
and several hundreds of millions in cryptocurrency that Bitvavo had arranged to be
lent to Genesis.
11. Following 3AC’s demise,
9
But Silbert had no intention of accepting
responsibility for DCG’s abuse of Genesis, nor saving Genesis or otherwise acting in
the best interests of Genesis and its creditors as residual claimants.
12.Acutely aware of the risks embedded in the mismanaged Gen
esis loan
book and of Genesis’s vulnerability to Gemini and Bitvavo, Silbert personally
stepped in to conceal the crisis at Genesis from its lenders. DCG manufactured a
series of false and misleading statements and directed their careful and calculated
dissemination to Genesis lenders. To that end,
These DCG-scripted falsehoods were
designed to induce customers, counterparties, and lenders (including Bitvavo and
those of Gemini) to keep their valuable crypto and fiat currencies on the Genesis
platform and to continue depositing even more assets with Genesis.
13.At the same time, like a captain fleeing a sinking ship before his
passengers, each of DCG and its co-Defendants continued to extract assets from the
Genesis operations for the benefit of Silbert and his larger empire. Barry Silbert,
Alan Silbert (Barry’s brother), DCG’s investment bank Ducera, Ducera’s CEO (and
10
Barry Silbert’s long-time friend) Kramer, and other DCG loyalists withdrew their
own fiat currency and crypto assets from Genesis—all while Silbert and his
henchmen were telling the market that DCG was stepping up to ensure Genesis was
not at risk.
14. On June 30, 2022, DCG, Silbert, Murphy, and Kraines, together with
Ducera and Kramer, orchestrated a further major fraud. When Genesis’s books were
closing at the end of the quarter, DCG issued a promissory note to Genesis pursuant
to which DCG promised to pay Genesis a purported $1.1 billion—but not for ten
years, and based on only 1% interest with no payment due until 2032 (the
“Promissory Note”). The point was to convince creditors that Genesis had received
an actual $1.1 billion in funding, when the Promissory Note in fact provided no new
liquidity and did not address Genesis’s fundamental insolvency.
15. Upon DCG’s insistence, Moro countersigned the Promissory Note on
behalf of Genesis. As DCG and Ducera had planned, the Promissory Note was then
egregiously overvalued on Genesis’s books at the face amount of $1.1 billion, when
its then-present value was a paltry fraction of that, in order to create the false
appearance of shoring up Genesis’s balance sheet. Ducera and Kramer provided
material assistance to DCG to create the structure and terms of the Promissory Note
and then gave DCG key advice about how to message the financials to Genesis
lenders.
11
The
Promissory Note was intended to provide the appearance of solvency at Genesis (and
to give more time for DCG and its loyalists to loot wh
at value remained) even though
Defendants knew Genesis was insolvent. Many creditors were ensnared by this ruse,
keeping capital at Genesis, lending more capital to Genesis, or even originating loans
for the first time.
16. As the crypto markets continued to weaken in 2022, Gemini and
Bitvavo were closely monitoring Genesis’s financial health and considering
withdrawing cryptocurrency from the platform. Genesis employees begged DCG for
help and alerted DCG to the fact that Genesis desperately needed liquidity and could
not withstand additional market disruption. Leading up to the close of Genesis’s
books in September 2022, DCG orchestrated another Genesis balance sheet trick
designed to further mislead Genesis customers. DCG caused Genesis to repay, in
advance of maturity, a cryptocurrency loan worth $100 million from a DCG affiliate;
that DCG affiliate paid the same $100 million in cryptocurrency to DCG in the form
of a dividend distribution; and DCG contributed the same $100 million in
cryptocurrency to Genesis as a purported equity infusion. This round-trip transaction
did nothing to improve Genesis’s liquidity position, but it furthered the false
representation to Gemini and Bitvavo that DCG was stepping up to provide much-
needed additional liquidity to Genesis. As a result of and in reliance on Defendants’
12
repeated misrepresentations and deceptive transactional maneuvers, including the
false valuation of the $1.1 billion Promissory Note and the roundtripped $100 million,
neither Gemini nor Bitvavo pulled assets from Genesis at the time, giving DCG and
its loyalists additional time to engage in self-dealing and misuse of Genesis assets
even long past its effective insolvency.
17. In early November, when Alameda’s sister company FTX collapsed,
Genesis could not continue. In the market turmoil, Genesis lenders began to call their
loans. With extreme exposure to Alameda, a nearly $1.1 billion hole on its balance
sheet from the 3AC collapse, and hundreds of millions in loans outstanding to DCG,
there was no hope left for Genesis.
18. Even then, DCG’s final acts were to squeeze yet more value out of
Genesis to the direct detriment of Genesis and its creditors. With Genesis desperate
for liquidity, DCG forced Genesis to further extend DCG’s loan repayment terms for
loans originally due in July 2022 and August 2022—in breach of existing loan
documents and without consideration. DCG also elected unilaterally to change the
repayment terms of a bitcoin loan from Genesis to allow payment instead in shares
of GBTC, an illiquid DCG affiliate investment product that was significantly less
valuable than bitcoin at the time. This “repayment” exacerbated Genesis’s liquidity
crunch because Genesis did not lend GBTC and could not sell GBTC in exchange for
liquid capital because of the SEC-imposed holding period. Moreover, Silbert
13
personally prohibited Genesis from hedging GBTC.
19. Due to Defendants’ extraordinary pattern of self-dealing, fraud, and
mismanagement of Genesis for Defendants’ own gain while Genesis was insolvent,
Genesis and hundreds of thousands of its individual creditors and institutional clients
were deprived of billions of dollars of value in crypto and fiat currencies. Silbert
continues to lie to this day, claiming he and DCG knew little of Genesis’s finances.
20. On November 16, 2022, creditor withdrawals were paused at Genesis.
On January 19, 2023, each of the Plaintiffs filed a petition for bankruptcy relief under
chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York. The Genesis Debtors’ bankruptcy plan was
confirmed on August 2, 2024.
21. As part of their bankruptcy plan, the Genesis Debtors retain claims and
causes of action on behalf of the Genesis Debtors and their bankruptcy estates against
Defendants. Further, Genesis’s largest creditor, Gemini, as agent for and on behalf
of its customers, assigned its claims against Defendants to GGC. The Genesis
Litigation Oversight Committee (the “LOC”) is a court-appointed representative
body of creditors who lost funds and cryptocurrency when withdrawals were
14
suspended and bankruptcy was declared at Genesis. At the direction of the LOC,
Plaintiffs file this Verified Complaint to hold Defendants accountable for breaching
fiduciary duties owed to Genesis and ultimately its creditors as residual claimants,
for unjust enrichment to the detriment of Genesis and its creditors, and for the fraud
committed on Genesis’s largest creditor, Gemini.
22. Post-confirmation, Genesis has repaid approximately $3 billion worth
of crypto assets and approximately $1.3 billion in U.S. dollars to its creditors, which
is only a portion of what creditors are owed. DCG and the other Defendants
contributed nothing to that recovery. Genesis creditors are still short crypto assets
valued at approximately $2.2 billion in U.S. dollars as of February 9, 2025, as well
as significant fees and interest. This deficiency includes 19,086 bitcoin, 69,197 ether,
and 17,168,249 other coins as of February 9, 2025. Plaintiffs seek to recover those
losses in kind. Genesis’s creditors deposited cryptocurrencies with Genesis, and their
contracts called for Genesis to repay them both principal and interest in
cryptocurrency. For Gemini, returning crypto in kind preserves the original bargain
struck with Genesis. In-kind recovery for Plaintiffs against their faithless fiduciaries
aligns with Genesis’s original promise of crypto-denominated returns to customers.
Moreover, in-kind recovery insulates Genesis and its creditors from the risk of
undercompensation due to the subsequent recovery of crypto prices. By contrast,
monetary damages could result in a windfall to the wrongdoers, as Defendants would
15
unjustly reap the benefit of the appreciation of the cryptocurrency they looted from
Genesis and its creditors while driving Genesis to its ultimate demise.
THE PARTIES
23. Plaintiff GGH is a passive holding company with no operations and is
the direct parent of Plaintiffs GGC and GAP. GGH, which is wholly owned by DCG,
is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware. GGH did not
have any formal internal governance processes, and did not have a board of directors
until July 2022 (the “GGH Board”), less than a year before its bankruptcy. GGH’s
chapter 11 bankruptcy plan was confirmed on August 2, 2024. GGH previously
maintained a principal place of business at DCG’s headquarters located at 250 Park
Avenue South, New York, New York. Its current principal place of business is 175
Greenwich Street, Floor 38, New York, New York.
24. Plaintiff GGC was a cryptocurrency lending company that borrowed
and lent digital assets and government fiat. GGC, which is wholly owned by GGH
and thus ultimately by DCG, is a limited liability company organized under the laws
of Delaware. GGC did not have a board of directors or formal internal governance
processes. GGC’s chapter 11 bankruptcy plan was confirmed on August 2, 2024.
GGC previously maintained a principal place of business at DCG’s headquarters
located at 250 Park Avenue South, New York, New York. Its current principal place
of